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Freeman: Limitation of Actions: When Florida's Medical Malpracitce Statute

CASE COMMENTS
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS: WHEN FLORIDA'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BEGINS To RUN* **

Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990)
Respondent filed a medical malpractice suit against petitioner,'
alleging that petitioner negligently failed to administer antibiotics before surgically removing malignant polyps from respondent's colon.2
Respondent alleged that this oversight caused him to develop a serious
post-operative infection in August of 1979.s Respondent's eyesight soon
began to deteriorate, and by December 31, 1979, he was blind. 4 Respondent filed suit on January 29, 1982, approximately one month
after another doctor suggested that his blindness was attributable to
petitioner's failure to administer antibiotics before the surgery. 5

Petitioner asserted that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred respondent's suit.6 The trial court granted petitioner's

motion for summary judgment, finding that respondent discovered the

*Editor'sNote: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment Award for Fall 1990.
**This comment is dedicated to my husband, David, and my parents, Tom and Beverley.
Many, many thanks to them for all of their love, patience, and encouragement. Thanks also to
my comment advisor, Edward Licitra, for his expert guidance and infinite patience.
1. Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990). After the complaint was filed, the
plaintiff-patient died. His widow prosecuted the claim as personal representative of his estate.
The personal representative, however, did not amend the complaint to claim wrongful death.
Id. at 1320 n.1.
2. Id. at 1320.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The applicable statute of limitations was FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979), which
provided:
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the
time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time
the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years
from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.
Id. This statute has remained unchanged since 1975.
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cause of his blindness by December 31, 1979, more than two years
before he filed suit. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
the summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to when respondent knew or should have known that
petitioner's failure to use antibiotics had caused respondent's blindness.8 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reasoned that respondent's
mere knowledge of his blindness did not trigger the limitation period
unless respondent knew -thatpetitioner's negligence caused the injury. 9
On appeal the Florida Supreme Court ordered the summary judgment
reinstated 0 and HELD, the medical malpractice limitation period commences when a plaintiff discovers or should discover either the negligent act that caused the injury or the injury itself."
Under traditional tort law, the limitation period for negligence
cases commenced when the injury occurred, even though the plaintiff
could not discover the injury until later. 12 The Florida Supreme Court
modified this traditional rule as it applied to medical malpractice
cases. 13 In Nardone v. Reynolds, the plaintiffs minor son underwent
brain surgery for vision and coordination problems. 14 After surgery,
the child's condition worsened until he was totally blind, irreversibly
brain damaged, and permanently comatose.' 5 The plaintiff sued his

7. Shapiro v. Barron, 538 So. 2d 1319, 1319 (4th D.C.A. 1989), quashed, 565 So. 2d 1319
(Fla. 1990).
8. Id. at 1320. The Fourth District Court of Appeal conceded that respondent must be
deemed to know the contents of his medical records, which had been continually available to
him since December 31, 1979. Id. at 1319 (citing Frankowitz v. Propst, 489 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1986)). The court also conceded that the information in those records alone furnished
sufficient grounds for respondent to believe his blindness was caused by petitioner's failure to
administer antibiotics. Id. at 1320. However, the court precluded summary judgment based on
Mrs. Shapiro's testimony that a doctor told her that tubes in her husband's stomach had caused
his infection. Id.
9. Id. at 1319 (citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)). The Fourth District's
reasoning rested on its reading of Moore that the plaintiff must know of both the defendant's
negligent act and the resulting injury to trigger the limitation period. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34. The Florida Supreme Court in Barron rejected this reading of Moore. 565
So. 2d at 1321.
10. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322.
11. Id.
12. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165-66 (5th ed. 1984). Dean Prosser noted that this rule subjected
some medical malpractice plaintiffs to "obvious and flagrant injustice" by allowing the limitation
period for their claims to expire before those plaintiffs ever discovered their injuries. Id.
13. Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976).
14. Id. at 28.
15. Id. at 29. Plaintiffs son was "beyond help or hope of recovery." Id.
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son's doctor for medical malpractice16 five years after the hospital
discharged his son, but less than two years after he discovered the
defendant's negligence. 17
8
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The court held that Florida's general four-year statute of limitations
20
barred the suit. 9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
certified several issues to the Florida Supreme Court. The most important question certified asked whether the limitation period commences
when a plaintiff discovers the injury or when the2 patient discovers
that the defendant's negligence caused the injury. '
The Florida Supreme Court held that the limitation period commences when a plaintiff first has notice of either a defendant's negligent

act or the resulting injury.2 The Nardone court reasoned that the

16. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 31-32. The plaintiff unquestionably knew of his son's vegetative state when his
son was discharged from the hospital more than five years before this suit was filed. Id. at 29.
The defendant doctors explained the hopelessness of the boy's condition and made his medical
records continually available to the plaintiff. Id. at 29-30. However, the plaintiff claimed that
he could not be charged with knowledge of the defendants' negligence until the plaintiff discovered
the negligence in the fall of 1969, approximately four years after his son was discharged from
the hospital. Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660, 661 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. Nardone, 333 So. 2d at 31.
19. Id. The applicable statute of limitations was FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1971), which provided that "any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter" must be filed within
four years. This general statute of limitations governed medical malpractice cases until 1972,
when the Florida legislature amended FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) to include medical malpractice
cases. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973).

20. Because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the Florida
Supreme Court, it did not affrm or reverse the district court. Nardone, 508 F.2d at 664.
21. Nardone, 333 So. 2d at 27-28. The Fifth Circuit certified four lengthy questions to the
Florida Supreme Court, inquiring in pertinent part:
In a medical malpractice case does the period of limitation commence... when
[the plaintiff has] (i) knowledge of the physical condition and the drastic change
therein during the course of medical treatment, but (ii) do[es] not then have (or
[is] not charged with having) knowledge that such physical mental condition was
caused in whole or in part by acts or non-acts of the alleged malpractitioners?
Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 33-34. The court relied on four main cases: City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d
306 (Fla. 1954) (because the plaintiffs injury was not immediately apparent and the plaintiff
had no notice of the defendant's negligence, commencement of limitation period was delayed
until the plaintiff had notice of the injury); Cristiani v. City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878 (Fla.
1953) (limitation period commenced when the defendant's truck negligently struck the plaintiffs
child even though child's injury was not discovered until after the limitation period had expired);
Viord v. Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969) (if the plaintiff knew of the act itself,
but could not discover its negligent character until the consequences became apparent, the
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severity of the child's injury put the plaintiff on notice that the plaintiffs legal rights had been violated.2 Therefore, the limitation period
commenced when the plaintiff knew of the injury, even though he did
not know that the defendant's negligence had caused the injury.2
While the Nardone suit was pending,2 the Florida legislature
passed a specific statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases.2
The statute stated that plaintiffs had two years from the time they
discovered or should have discovered "the injury" to file medical malpractice suits.27 In Moore v. Morris,28 the Florida Supreme Court's
first case interpreting the new statute, the court determined that the
new statute did not change when the medical malpractice limitation
period commences.2 Without discussion, the Moore court held that
Nardone continued to control when the limitation period commences.
Applying the Nardone rule, 31 the Moore court reversed summary judgment for the defendant doctor, finding a genuine issue of material fact
as to when the plaintiffs should have known that their daughter was
brain damaged by oxygen deprivation during birth.3 2 The court
reasoned that some serious medical complications occur so frequently
that knowledge of such complications could not constitute notice of

limitation period commenced only when the plaintiff had notice of the consequences); Buck v.
Mouradian, 100 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958) (limitation period commenced when the plaintiff
learned she had suffered slight injury, even though she could not have known the full extent
of her injury until four years later). Id. at 32-34.
23. Nardone, 333 So. 2d at 33. "[S]ince in 1965 the nature of the child's condition was
obvious and known to the plaintiffs, it was then that the cause of action accrued and the statute
of limitations commenced to run.
... Id.
24. Id.
25. Nardone was decided under the statute of limitations in effect when the suit was filed,
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1971). Id. at 27. See supra note 19.
26. See supra note 19.
27. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973). This statute required that plaintiffs file within two years
"an action to recover damages for injuries . . . arising from any medical . . . treatment or
surgical operation, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury." Id.
28. 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985).
29. Id. at 667. The court noted that the applicable statute of limitations was FLA. STAT.
§ 95.11(6) (1973), but nowhere (lid the court cite the text of this statute. The court never
acknowledged that the language of this statute was different from the language of the statute
that governed the cases relied on as precedent. Id. at 667-69. The pertinent language of FLA.
STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973) was the same as FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (Supp. 1972). See supranote 27.
30. Moore, 475 So. 2d at 667. See supra note 29.
31. See supra text accompanying note 22.
32. Moore, 475 So. 2d at 669. "'The parents knew ... that there was a problem with the
delivery, that the child had swallowed something which restricted breathing, and that the child
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medical negligence.1s Thus, mere knowledge of relatively common complications does not automatically trigger the limitation period.34
While the litigation in Moore continued,s the Florida legislature
twice changed the medical malpractice statute of limitations.3 First,
the 1974 version of the statute allowed a plaintiff two years from the
time he or she should have discovered the "cause of action" to file a
medical malpractice suit.37 The second amendment produced the pres-

ent statute which requires plaintiffs to ifie suit within two years of
the "incident" that gave rise to the action.a The present statute also
provides that if a plaintiff does not immediately ascertain the "incident"
that caused the injury, the limitation period will commence when the

plaintiff discovers, or should discover, that an 'incident" has occurred.3 9 This version of the statute was part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975,40 an expansive body of legislation aimed at

reducing skyrocketing malpractice insurance rates and the accompanying rise in consumer medical costs. 41

was starved for oxygen."' Id. at 668 (quoting Moore v. Morris, 429 So. 2d 1209, 1209-10 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1983)). The court noted, however, that the baby appeared to have fully recovered
and was not diagnosed as brain damaged until she was three years old. Id. at 669.
33. Id. at 668. Unlike the Moore baby's undiagnosed brain damage, the injuries suffered
in Nardone and the instant case were much more obvious. The Nardone patient deteriorated
into a vegetative state. Nardone, 333 So. 2d at 29. The instant plaintiff "Went in for an operation
on his colon and came out blind." Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321. Thus, while the limitation period
began to run immediately in Nardone and the instant case, the Moore court concluded that the
statute did not necessarily begin to run until plaintiffs were aware of the baby's brain damage
as well as the complications at her birth. Moore, 475 So. 2d at 669.
34. See supra note 33.
35. Moore was decided under the statute of limitations in effect when the child was born,
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973), even though the limitation period did not begin to run until three
years later. Moore, 475 So. 2d at 667. The pertinent part of FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973) was
the same as that of FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (Supp. 1972). See supra note 27.
36. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1975).
37. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974). This statute provided that "the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence." Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1989). This statute has remained unchanged since 1975. See
supra note 6.
39. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1989).
40. The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 13.
41. Id. The legislature made clear itspurpose in the act's preamble:
WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance for
doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few months; and
WHEREAS, it is not uncommon to find physicians in the high risk categories
paying premiums in excess of $20,000 annually; and
WHEREAS, the consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens created
by the high cost of insurance; and
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Following enactment of the 1975 statute, the Fourth District Court
2
of Appeal decided FloridaPatient's CompensationFund v. Tillman.4
The court held that the new limitation period commences only when
a plaintiff should have discovered three elements: (1) a medical procedure, (2) the negligence with which the procedure was performed, and
(3) an injury which this negligently performed procedure caused.Based on this rule, the court upheld a jury verdict 4 which found that
the defendant had negligently treated the plaintiff. 45 The court
reasoned that the statute's reference to discovery of the "incident"
could not mean discovery of the medical procedure itself because the
plaintiff would always discover the procedure at the time that it was
performed. 46 Therefore, to provide meaning to the statute's provision
concerning the plaintiffs delayed discovery of the "incident," the court
concluded that discovery of the "incident" must include both the dis47
covery of negligence and that the negligence injured the patient.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
Tillman interpretation of the present medical malpractice statute of
limitations.4 The instant. court held that the rule established in Nar-

WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced to curtail
their practices, retire, or practice defensive medicine at increased cost to the
citizens of Florida; and
WHEREAS, the problem has reached crisis proportion in Florida....
Id. For a discussion of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, see Probert, Nibbling at
the Problems of Medical Malpractice, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 56 (1975).
42. 453 So. 2d 1376 (4th D.C.A. 1984), modified on other grounds, 487 So. 2d 1032 (Fla.
1986).
43. Id. at 1379. See infra note 84.
44. FloridaPatient's Comp. Fund, 453 So. 2d at 1380.
45. Id. at 1379-80.
46. Id. at 1379. "The term incident' . . . could not refer solely to the particular medical
procedure since that would obviously be 'discovered' at the time it was performed, rendering
nugatory the additional two year period permitted by the statute for discovering the incident." Id.
47. Id. For a short discussion of the weakness of this interpretation, see infra note 84.
Before the instant decision, courts widely followed the Tillman interpretation of when this
statute's limitation period commences. See, e.g., Elliot v. Barrow, 526 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1988) (knowledge that patient fell off an x-ray table, without knowledge that the fall
was caused by negligence or actually injured patient, did not automatically trigger the limitation
period); Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Sitomer, 524 So. 2d 671 (4th D.C.A. 1988) (knowledge
that plaintiffs skin fell off her breasts after implants were inserted, without knowledge that
the skin loss was caused by doctor's negligence, did not necessarily trigger the limitation period),
quashed on other grounds sub nom., Smith v. Sitomer, 550 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1989); Cohen v.
Baxt, 473 So. 2d 1340 (4th D.C.A. 1985) (plaintiff's knowledge of the presence of blood clots in
his kidneys did not necessarily trigger the limitation period), modified sub nom., Florida Patient's
Comp. Fund v. Cohen, 488 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1986).
48. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321.
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done controlled the interpretation of the present statute of limitations49 even though Nardone was decided under an earlier statute °
The instant court explicitly stated that the limitation period commences
when the plaintiff should know of either the injury or the defendant's
negligent act.r'
The instant court noted that the present statute provides that the
'"ncident," 52 not the injury, triggers the limitation period. The instant
court dismissed the inconsistency between its interpretation and the
plain language of the statute as immaterial because the statute interpreted in Nardone also did not provide that the injury triggered the
limitation period.6 Further, the instant court suggested that in some
circumstances the limitation period could commence before the plaintiff
discovered either the negligence or the injury.5 The instant court did
not, however, explain what those circumstances might be.
In a strong dissent, Justice Shaw argued that the statutory term
'ncident" referred only to the negligent act that gave rise to the
malpractice action. 5 He accused the majority of ignoring the legislative
intent behind the present statute.6 Justice Shaw pointed out that an
earlier version of the statute provided that the limitation period for
medical malpractice actions commences when the plaintiff discovers
"the injury.

'57

However, Justice Shaw emphasized that the legislature

deliberately removed the words "the injury," and the statute now
provides that a plaintiffs discovery of 'the incident" will trigger the
limitation period. 5 Justice Shaw reasoned that the change in statutory

49. Id. at 1322.
50. Id.
51. Id. "We believe that the reasoning of Nardone continues to be applicable to the current
statute. Thus, the limitation period commences when the plaintiff should have known either of
the injury or the negligent act." Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979). See supra note 6.
53. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321. The court wrote:
While the current statute does not say that the cause of action occurs at the time
of the injury, neither did the statute under consideration in Nardone. In fact, it
could be argued that by using the word "incident" the legislature envisioned that
there would be some factual circumstances in which the statute would begin to
run before either the negligence or the injury became known.
Id. at 1321-22.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1322 (Shaw, J. dissenting).
56. Id. at 1323.
57. Id. at 1322. For the text of this statute, see supra note 27.
58. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322 (Shaw, J., dissenting). See supra note 6.
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language demonstrated the legislature's intent to change the commencement of the limitation period from discovery of the injury to
59
discovery of the underlying negligence.
Justice Shaw also criticized the majority's reliance on Nardone.6°
He argued that the Nardone reasoning should not apply to cases
decided under the present statute because Nardone was decided under
a general statute of limitations before the legislature enacted the present medical malpractice statute of limitations.6 1 Justice Shaw reasoned
that the present statute's specific provisions superseded the62 Nardone
court's interpretation of the general statute of limitations.
Finally, Justice Shaw argued that the majority's interpretation of
the statute will unfairly deny many plaintiffs their day in court.6 He
noted that plaintiffs often discover their injury long before they discover that their physician's negligence caused the injury.64 Justice
Shaw was concerned that a limitation period triggered by the plaintiffs
discovery of the injury could expire before or shortly after the plaintiff
suspects that negligence was the cause of any medical complications.r

59. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322-23 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw greatly emphasized
the legislature's changing the limitation period trigger from discovery of "the injury" to discovery
of "the cause of action" and then to discovery of "the incident." He wrote that "[bly changing
the terminology, the legislature clearly intended to change the commencement of the running
of the statute to the time when the negligence or malpractice was discovered." Id. at 1322.
60. Id. at 1323.
61. Id.
62. Id. For the text of this statute, see supra note 19.
63. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1323 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Justice Shaw wrote:
As I see it, medical malpractice situations generally unfold thusly: 1) the negligent
act, or malpractice, takes place, which results in 2) the victim suffering an injury;
3) the injury is subsequently discovered, and this leads to 4) the discovery of the
malpractice. Because the discovery of the injury may precede the discovery of the
malpractice by months or even years, the present ruling has the practical effect
of drastically shortening the limitations period in many cases.
Id. at 1322.
65. Id. Justice Shaw argued that the majority's interpretation of "incident" could unfairly
extend the statute's period of repose which states that 'in no event shall the action be commenced
later than 4 years from the date of the incident."' Id. at 1323 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b)
(1979)). Although the facts of the instant case did not raise the issue, Justice Shaw argued that
the majority's interpretation of "incident" as either the defendant's negligent act or the patient's
resulting injury could subject doctors to potentially endless periods of liability 'inthose cases,
such as 'lost sponge' cases or faulty reproductive sterilization cases, where there may be no
actual 'injury' until many years after the malpractice." Id. at 1323. Justice Shaw argued that
his interpretation of 'incident" as referring only to the defendant's negligent act was preferable
to the majority's interpretation because it created a "bright line cutoff' for filing suit: no claim
could be filed more than four years after the negligent act. Id.
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The instant decision places a duty on patients to investigate the
possible causes of any medical complications that they experience. The
statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action commences when
patients discover their condition. Therefore, patients, as potential
plaintiffs, must determine within two years of discovering any medical
complications whether their condition is merely a normal consequence
of their medical treatment or an injury caused by their doctor's negligence.0
Likewise, a patient's discovery of a negligent act also triggers the
limitation period. Thus, patients who suspect possible negligence, such
as an incorrect diagnosis or an overdose of x-ray radiation, must determine within two years whether that negligence has injured him or
her. 7 Determining possible injury may be difficult for some patients
because many injuries do not manifest themselves for several years.68
As Justice Shaw pointed out in his dissent, this difficulty with
recognizing negligence or injury will deny some malpractice plaintiffs
their day in court.6 9 However, the barring of some causes of action
could have been the legislative intent behind the present statute of
limitations. 70 The legislature stated that it intended the Malpractice
Reform Act to remedy skyrocketing malpractice insurance rates which
the legislature stated had reached "crisis proportions.' 71 While the
instant majority did not cite the legislature's intent as a reason for
its decision, the effect of the court's decision conforms to this legislative
intent.72 Conversely, the rule urged by Justice Shaw's dissent would

66. See, e.g., Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958). But see Schafer v.
Lehrer, 476 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985) (citing Moore for the proposition that
knowledge of physical injury, without knowledge that it was caused by the defendant's negligence, does not trigger the limitation period).
67. See, e.g., Cristiani v. City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1953); Buck v. Mouradian,
100 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958). See also Wilhelm v. Traynor, 434 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1983) (the plaintiffs knowledge that the defendant negligently failed to diagnose cancer
triggered the limitation period, even though the plaintiff did not suffer the consequences of the
misdiagnosis for over one year).
68. See, e.g., Buck, 100 So. 2d at 71 (the plaintiff could not have known the full extent of
her injury until four years after the incident).
69. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1323 (Shaw, J., dissenting). In Carr v. Broward County, 541 So.
2d 92, 95 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations did not
violate the plaintiffs' right of access to the courts guaranteed by FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21,
because the legislature had found an "overriding public necessity for the legislation." Id. For
the legislature's finding of public necessity, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. For the reasons stated by the instant majority, see supratext accompanying notes 49-54.
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have the opposite effect. Justice Shaw's interpretation would delay
the commencement of the limitation period and allow plaintiffs more
time to file suit. Thus, Justice Shaw's interpretation would not address
the medical malpractice "crisis."
However, Justice Shaw's argument that the change in statutory
language demonstrates legislative intent to change the commencement
of the limitation period 73 merits consideration. Although this argument
appears logical, it is weakened by an intervening statute4 which first
replaced the plaintiff's discovery of "the injury" 7 with the plaintiffs
discovery of "the cause of action. '76 Only in the following year did the
legislature amend the statute so that the plaintiffs discovery of "the
77
incident" triggered the limitation period.
Justice Shaw argued that the changes in statutory language demonstrate that the legislature, in passing the present statute, did not
intend for the mere discovery of injury to trigger the limitation
period.7 8 However, the legislature's intent is uncertain because the
word "incident ' 79 replaced "cause of action, " not "injury." 81 Therefore,
the majority opinion in the instant case could be interpreted as reflecting the legislature's intent in changing "cause of action" to "incident." 8 This change could mean that the legislature did not intend
the limitation period to begin only when the plaintiff discovers both
the negligence and the injury that constitute a malpractice cause of
action. Rather, this interpretation suggests that the legislature meant
for the limitation period to commence when the plaintiff discovers
either of these elements to a negligence cause of action.8
T

73. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322 (Shaw, J., dissenting). See supra note 59.
74. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974). The 1972 version of the medical malpractice
statute of limitations made the plaintiffs discovery of "the injury" trigger the limitation period.
See supra note 27. The 1974 version made the plaintiff's discovery of "the cause of action"
trigger the limitation period. See supra note 37. The 1975 version of the statute made the
plaintiffs discovery of "the incident" trigger the limitation period. See supra note 6.
75. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(b) (1973).

76.

FLA. STAT.

77. FLA. STAT.
78. Barron, 565
79. FLA. STAT.
80. FLA. STAT.
81. FLA. STAT.
82. FLA. STAT.

§ 95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).
§ 95.11(4)(b) (1975).
So. 2d at 1322. See supra note 59.
§ 95.11(4)(b) (1975).
§ 95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).
§ 95.11(6) (1973).

§ 95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).

83. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1975).

84. In contrast, the Tillman interpretation of this statute required that the plaintiff know
of both the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury to trigger the limitation period.
Tillman, 453 So. 2d at 1379. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. The Tillman interpre-
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Unfortunately, the majority's reasoning supporting this interpretation of the statute was mechanical. The majority simply extended the
Nardone rule to the current statute,8 even though Nardone was

decided under a general statute of limitations that did not specifically
address the issue of medical malpractice. The majority did not explain
why it deemed the Nardone view preferable to the Tillman interpretations Nor did the majority address the dissent's argument that
'"ncident"89 should refer only to the negligent act itself.9 In fact, unlike

the dissent, 91 the majority made only a cursory attempt to interpret
the statutory term '"ncident."9 Instead, the instant court ignored the
legislature's deliberate change in statutory language 93 and simply
applied the Nardone rule to the facts of the instant case.9

The instant case's importance lies in the court's reluctance to
change the law governing the commencement of the medical malprac-

tice limitation period. Despite the changes in statutory language, the
instant court merely extended the traditional Nardone rule95 to the

present statute. The instant court easily could have concluded, as the
dissent did, that Nardone did not apply to cases decided under the
present statute of limitations9 The court also could have concluded,

as the dissent did, that fairness to plaintiffs required beginning the
limitation period only when the plaintiff discovers the negligence that
caused the injury.Y

However, by refusing to delay the commencement of the limitation
period,9 the instant court furthered the apparent legislative intent

tation, however, fails to account for the legislature's deliberate change in statutory language.
By interpreting '"ncident" to mean both the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury
(both elements of the malpractice cause of action), Tillman renders meaningless the legislative
substitution of "incident" for "cause of action."
85. See supra text accompanying note 22.
86. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1989).
87. See supra note 19.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
89. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979). For the text of this statute, see supra note 6.
90. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322 (Shaw, J. dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1321.
93. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1975). The legislature substituted the plaintiffs discovery of
"the incident" for the plaintiffs discovery of 'the cause of action" as the limitation period trigger.
Id.
94. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321.
95. See supra text accompanying note 22.
96. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1323.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1322.
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behind the present statute of limitations. The legislature intended to
reduce rising societal costs of widespread medical malpractice liability.9 Thus, because the courts and the legislature are in consonance,
any change in the law governing the medical malpractice limitation
period must be a creature of legislature.
Nancy Freeman

99.

See supra note 41.
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